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ABSTRACT
This paper is concerned wíth the classic "guns versus butter"
dílemma. There are two countries engaged in an arms race. The first
country is a decentralized market economy and the second country is a
command economy. This asymmetry might capture the difference between
West and East. The government of each country maximizea the life-time
utility of the representative consumer, which depends upon conaumption,
leisure and defence. Defence is a characteriatic, which depends positi-
vely upon the own weapon stock and negatively upon the foreign weapon
stock. The government of the first country usea distortionary taxes on
labour íncome to finance the provision of public goods, whereas the
government of the second country simply commands its constituents.
This paper contrasts coordinated and decentralized decision
making. It is argued that coordinated policiea lead to lower levels of
government spending and arms accumulation. As far as decentralized deci-
sion making is concerned, it is crucial to distinguish between open-
loop, general closed-loop and subgame-perfect Nash equilibria. The open-
loop Nash equilibrium relies upon pre-commitment to an announced path of
~ This paper was presented to a Meeting of the European Public Choice
Society, April 2-5, 1986, Noordwíjkerhout, The Netherlands and to a Con-
ference on International Economic Security organized by the Centre for
Economic Policy Research, June 19R6, London. The authors are grateful to
the participants of those meetings for their comments and to A. Markink
for excellent computational assistance.
government spending and is the solution concept moet frequently used in
the literature. The problem with this concept is that it relies upon
very restrictive information sets and over-eatimates the inefficiencea
generated by the arms race. The closed-loop Nash equilibrium allows each
country to have knowledge of current and past weapon stocks. Within this
framework it is possible to model threata, which can induce cooperative
behaviour. The principle of subgame-perfection gíves uniquenesa and cre-
dibility within the class of closed-loop Nash equilibria. This subgame-
perfect equilibrium coincides with the open-loop equilibrium when uti-
lity is separable in home and foreign weapon stocks. In general, this is
not the case and subgame-perfect equilibria typically lead to less arms
accwnulation than open-loop equilibria. This illustrates that in a game-
theoretic context an increase in information can make both countries
better off and countries should therefore be encouraged to monitor the
weapon stocka of their rival.
The results are illustrated wíth a numerical example based upon
CES utility functions and linear technologiea. This gives an opportunity
to test a recently developed algorithm for the calculation of aubgame-
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Conflict over arms accumulation has in recent years become a
more prevalent feature of relations between West and East. The political
aspects of the arms race receive a great deal of attention both in the
press and in academic studies [e.g. Richardaon (1960), Boulding (1961),
McGuire (1965), SIPRI (1982)]. Much of the theoretical analysis of arms
conflict has a game-theoretic nature [e.g. Schelling (1980)]. The wel-
fare of one country depends on the level of aecurity, which is perceived
to be an increasing function of ita own weapon atock and a decreasing
function of the foreign weapon stock. Thia may be because any imbalance
in weapon stocks increases the likelihood of looaing a poasible war and
íncreases the likelihood that a war might in fact be initiated. Alter-
natively, a country may simply feel that it gains international preatige
from having a more superior army than ita rivals. Both of theae factora
can in principle lead to a balance of terror. Such defence externalities
can also be shown to lead to prisoner's dilemma situations. In the ab-
sence of cooperation each country builds up a larger weapon atock than
with cooperation as in the absence of commitments no country trusta the
other countries to stick to a negotiated level of lower or zero weapon
stocks. Other studies concentrate on the technological and atrategic
aspects of arms and the relationship to the probability that war breaka
out [Saaty (1968), Intriligator (1975), Arito and Intriligator (1976),
Intriligator and Brito (1982)].
From the point of view of an economist, the purely polítical
analyses of conflict over arme do not pay adequate attention to the
"guns versus butter" dilemma. A higher level of investment in weapons
eventually increases security and welfare, but it also means that there
are less resources available for private sector consumption and there-
fore welfare diminishes. A variety of atudiea employ optimal control and
differential game theory to analyse the intertemporal trade-offa in-
herent in such "guns veraus butter" dilemmas [e.g. Brito (1972), Deger
and Sen (1984)]. The main problem with these studies is that they con-
sider open-loop Nash equílibriian solutions whereas feedback Nash equili-
brium solutions are in most casea more appropriate [e.g. Simaan and Cruz
(1975)]. The advantage of the latter type of solution concept is that
z
the resulting equilibrium relies on more realistic information sets,
since each country is assumed to be able to moni[or the current levels
of weapon stocks rather than to be able to observe only the initial
weapon stocks. The informational non-uniqueness resulting from closed-
loop information sets with memory [Baqar and Olsder (1982), Section 6.3]
is reaolved when the principle of subgame-perfection [Selten (1975)] is
imposed, which has the added advantage that the resulting equilibrium
etrategies are credible. It is clear that the importance of informatio-
nal assumptions requirea more attention than the literature has given it
so far. For example, each country may be able to observe its own weapon
stock accurately and to obaerve the foreign weapon stock not at all or
inaccurately. Other shortcomings of these atudies are that they are
really concerned with conflict between two command economies and typi-
cally no attentíon is paid to how output is determined and how the
weapons are to be financed. It ia clear that, at least for the West, a
decentralized market economy ia a better deacription. This raises va-
ríous issues of optimal dynamic taxation, aince the investment in
weapons usually has to be financed by distortionary taxes.
The objectives of this paper are to reconsider the "guns versus
butter" dilemma, to allow for conflict between a decentralized market
economy (the West) and a command economy (the East), and to contrast
open-loop and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium solutions with outcomes
under coordination. Section 2 formulates a aimple general equilibrium
model of a market economy and Section 3 formulates a simple model of a
command economy. Each government maximizes the diacounted utility of the
representative household, which depends on consumption, leisure and de-
fence. Defence is a characteristíc, which depends poeitívely upon the
own weapon stock and negatively upon the foreign weapon atock. The
government of the West uses distortionary taxes on labour income to fi-
nance the provision of arms, whereas the government of the East commands
its constituents directly. Section 4 discusses coordinated decision
making and shows that, under epecial circumstances, cooperation leade to
a gradual running down of weapon stocks via wear and tear. Section S
analyses decentralized decision making. The equilibri~mi for the open-
loop information pattern corresponds to a saddlepoint in which the accu-
mulated weapon stock in the East for similar preferences and technolo-
giea is larger than the accumulated weapon atock in the West. It is ar-
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gued that when utilitiea are separable in home and foreign weapon
stocks, as is the case for Cobb-Douglas utility functions, the open-loop
Nash equilibrium and the subgame-perfect equilibrium must coincide.
Finally, it is shown that closed-loop equilibria which are based on in-
vestment strategies with threats can induce a cooperative outcome. Sec-
tion 6 considers the more general situation where utility is not sepa-
rable in defence. This is accomplished with a nested utility function;
for example a CES utility function that depends on a composíte commodi-
ty, given by a Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function that depends on con-
sumption and leisure, and defence. For thia more general case, subgame-
perfect equilibría lead to leas arms accumulation than open-loop Nash
equilibria. This suggeste that countries should be encouraged to monitor
the weapon stocks of thelr rivala, since this leads to less arms. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper with a summary and some suggestions for fur-
ther research.
2. Optimal dynamic taxation and the provision of arms in a market-orien-
ted economy
Consider a decentralized market economy with a representative
household, a representative firm and a government. There are no domestic
or foreign financial assets and the economy does not engage in interna-
tional trade. There is no private sector capítal accumulation, although
the government invests in weapon stocks. There is only one domestically
produced commodity, which is like "jelly" as ít can be used for both
consumption and investment purposes. The government demands goods for
investment purposes, the houaehold supplies labour and demands goods for
consumption purposes, and the firm demands labour and supplíes goods.
The real wage adjusts in order to ensure labour market equilibrium. The
government finances the provision of public goods, i.e. weapon stocks,
by means of distorttonary taxes on labour income and maximizes the uti-
lity of the representative household. The problem of optimal taxation is
that the household values epending on publíc goods, but it is not pte-
pared to pay for it.
The representative household maximizea its utility subject to
its budget constraint. The main analysis in this paper is based upon a
Cobb-Douglas utility function, although the expressions for general uti-
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lity functions are also given. This utility function is increasing in
consumption of goods, leísure and defence and, what will be important,
it is separable in defence. Section 6 extends the analysis for a CES
utility function, which allows for non-separability between goods and
leisure on the one hand and defence on the other hand. Both of these
utility functions lead to linear Engel curves, so that aggregation
across households is possíble and therefore the assumption of a repre-
sentative household is justified. Utility is assumed to be homogeneous
of degree one in consumption and leisure. Defence is a characteristic
[cf. Lancaster (1966)], which is an increasing function of the own
weapon stock and a decreasing function of the foreign weapon stock. It
is assumed to be homogeneous of degree one in the respective weapon
stocka. Consumption cannot exceed disposable income, which consista of
after-tax wages and dividends. The household's problem is:
~ ~




(1 ~ c ~ wR( 1-t) ~- n- y, (2)
ai ~ 0, al f a2 s 1
subject to the household's budget conetraint
c: real coneumption of goods
R: supply of labour
R,: total amount of time available to the household
d: level of defence or security
w: real wage rate
r: rate of taxation on labour income
n: real profíts or divídends
y: real disposable income
a: weapon stock of the decentralized market economy
a~: weapon stock of the command economy
For an interior solution, the marginal rate of substitution between lei-
sure, R-R~ and consumption equals the real opportunity cost of leisure:
5
U ~U ~ w(1-T),
ft- R c
(3)
Because utility is homogeneous of degree one, this yields consumptíon
c s(R-A.) h(w(1-T)) ~~(w(1-T)) YU, ~' ~ 0, h' ~ 0 (4)
and the supply of labour
1C - R - ~(w(1-T)) YU ~h(w(1-T)), (5)
where h 1(c~(1C-R)) - U ~Uc, y0 ~ w(1-T) R, t n is full-employment ín-
R- R
come
and ~(W(1-T)) ~ h(w(1-T))I{h(w(1-T)) f W(1-T)}.
An increase in profits (or time available to the household) increases
income, so that consumption increaaes and labour supply falls as both
consumption and leisure are normal goods given the assumption of homoge-
neous utility functions. For Cobb-Douglas utility functions, h(w(1-T)) ~
al w(1-T)~d2 and ~(w(1-T)) - al so that an increase in the after-tax
wage increases consumption and the supply of labour.
The representative firm (with linear technology) chooses the
demand for labour to maximize profits:
Maximize n- f(R) - wR ~ BR - wR, f' ~ 0, f" ~ 0,
R
so that f'(R) ~ S- w and n~ 0.
Labour market equilibrium gives w~ W(T) ~ B, employment,
R- L( T) - al R,
and consumption,




For Cobb-Douglas utility functions and constant-returns-to-scale produc-
tion functions, a tax cut increases the opportunity cost of leisure so
that the household substitutes away from leisure towards consumption.
Labour supply is unaffected, since the substitution effect is exactly
off-set by the íncome effect.
Upon substitution of (7) and ( 8) into ( 1), one obtains the in-
direct utility function:
~ ~U(t,a,a ) - U(C(i), k-L(i), d(a,a )) ~
,~ . ~ ~
al ln(1-t) f a3 ln(a~a ) f aU, Ua ~ 0, U~ ~ 0, UT ~ 0,
a
(9)
where aD - al ln(al s) f a2 ln a2 f ln R. The r81e of the government is
to provide the public good, defence, and finance it with taxea on labour
income. Government investment, g, leads to the accumulation of weapon
stocks,
a~ g- da. a(0) a aU. (1Q)
where d is the depreciation rate, and needs to be financed by distortio-
nary taxation,
g a r W( r) L( T) 3 T B al !C. (11)
Note, that summing of the household budget constraint, (2), and the
government budget conatraint, (11), yields the familiar national accoun-
ting identity:
c~-g- wkf n- f(R). (12)
The government of the market economy chooses the tax rate in
order to maximize the discounted utility of the representative house-
hold,
m ~
Maximize J exp (-rt) U(t,a,a )dt (13)
T n
where r is the pure rate of time preference, subject to (10) and (11).
The dilemma of "guns versus butter" for a market economy ia that high
tax rates are required to ensure a large build-up of weapons, but that
this necessarily implies less private sector coneumption.
3. The "guns versus butter" dilemma in a command economy
The previous section discussed a stylized model of the market-
oriented Western economies (e.g, the U.S.A.). The objective of this
paper is to analyse conflict over arms accumulatíon between the Western
economies and the Eastern economies (e.g. the U.S.S.R.). It ia probably
more realistic to describe the Eastern bloc by a command or centrally
planned economy than by a decentralized market economy. The effects of
such asymmetries ín economic organization on the arms race have not been
discussed previously in the literature. For simplicity, it is assumed
that the two economies have identical tastes, technologies and popula-
tion sizes. The variables and expressions deacribing the Eastern bloc
will be distinguished from the ones describing the West by an asterisk.
The government of the centrally planned economy does not levy
taxes, but commands the household how much to consume and how much to
work and commands the firm how many workers to hire and how much to pro-
duce. The optimal plan follows from maximizing the utility of the repre-
~r ~ - ~t ~t
sentative household, U(c ,!C-R ,d ), subject to the material balance
~ ~ ~
condition, f(R ) m c ~- g. Hence, the margínal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption equals the marginal producttvity of
labour, so that
~ ~ ~ ~ ~~
c ~ (1L-R ) h (f'(R )), h ~ 0 (14)
holds. With the material balance condition this yields
R~ ~ L~ ( g~ ) s al R f a2 g~ I B (15)
and
c~ ~ 0~(g~) ~ al(BR-g~). (16)
8
,~ ~ ~ ,~ ~ t ~
where L~- {f' ( R) f h -( f.-R ) h f" ( R )}-1 ~ 0 and
C~~ ~-~h~ -(R-R~) h~~f "(R~)} L~~ ~ 0.
8 8
~onsumptton and employment do not depend dírectly on the level of eecu-
rity, since it has been asaumed that utility is separable in defence.
When the central planning authority allocates more resources to invest-
ment in weapon stocks, there are leas resources available for consump-
tion purposes and, consequently, the people consume less and work more
hours. This one-to-one crowding out captures the "guns versus butter"
dilemma for the Eastern bloc. Note that for identical levels of invest-
ment in weapons (and identical tastes and technologies), the Eastern
bloc employs more labour and consumes more than the West:
~ ~ ~ ~
c ~ C(8 )~ al(BR-g )~ c a C(t) ~ al B1C - 8, (17)
~
when g(~a116R) a g. The reason for this result is that the Western eco-
nomy levies distortionary taxes on labour income, which reduces the real
opportunity cost of leiaure and therefore Western households supply less
labour and consume leas. Obvioualy, if the West has a more productive
~technology (say, B~ B), it is possible for the West to be more af-
~ ~fluent than the Eastern bloc (c ~ c yet R~ R).
Using (15) and (16), one obtains the indirect utility function:
U~(8~,a~,a) - U~(C~(8~), iZ-L~(8~), à~(a~,a)) -
ln(1-g~~BR) f a3 ln(a~~a) t aU,
.,~ ~~ ~~
U~ ~ 0, Ua ~ U, U~ ~ 0.
a g
(18)
The optimal defence strategy of the central planning authority of the
Eastern bloc follows from maximizing the discounted utility of the re-
presentatlve household,
~ -~ ~ ~






á~ s g~ - da~ , a~ ( 0) a a0 .
4. Cooperative behaviour
( 20)
Before the problems of conflict over weapons accumulation are
discussed, it seems appropriate to brlefly conslder coordínation of arms
accumulation. Pareto efficient outcomes for the Western and Eastern bloc
ma be found from choosin t and ~y g g to maximize joint welfare,
~
! exp(-rt) {9 U(r,a,a~) t(1-9) U~(g~,a~,a)} dt, (21)
0
~
subject to T, g~ 0, (9) -(11), (18) and (20). This yields
9 UT t a{W( t) L( t) f T W7( t) L( t) f T W( T) LT( t) } ~ 0
c.s.,
t ~ 0 (22)
,~ ~




. .. ,~ - ~ ~t ,t
a ~ (rfa) a - 9 Ua(T.a,a ) - (1-e) ua(g ,a ,a),
lim e rt a(t) a(t) - 0,
t~
' ~ ~ - ,t ~,t ,~ ,~
a - (rfd) a - 9 U ~(t,a,a ) - (1-9) U ~(g ,a ,a),
a a






(10) and (20), where a and a are the marginal values of the weapon
stocka of the Western and F.astern bloc, respectively. Under the aesump-
tion that the "world peace authority" attachea equal weights to the
Western and Eastern bloc, i.e. 9~}, and using the specific functional
forms for the utility functiona adopted in the previoua sectione, it
~follows that a(t) ~ a(t) - 0, for all t. This reault holds whenever
10
,. ., ~ . ~ ,.
Ua ~-U a and U~ 3-U ~, that is whenever the game between the two eco-
nomies is zeroasum atathe margin with reapect to a and a~. It impliea~
that 1(t) z g(t) - 0, for all t, so that the cooperative outcome is for
both economiea to stop investing in arms and to run down weapon atocks
(via the natural process of wear and tear) until they have fallen to
zero. This outcome is probably close to one's intuition, although it
should be noted that it pertaina only under rather special conditions.
Due to the asymmetry in economic organizatíon of the West and the East,
it may well be that the Nash bargaining solution does not coincide with
f-}, Furthermore, the utility functíons may not be separable or homo-
geneous of degree one in a and a~ and then the cooperative outcome need
not necessarily lead to a moratorium on investment in weapons. The co-
operative outcome ís not sustainable, since each country has an incen-
tive to devíate and increase its security at the expense of its rival by
investing more in weapons.
S. Competitive behaviour and the arms race
Consider the situation where the Western and the Eastern bloc do
not cooperate when they accumulate weapon stocks. Sínce there is an uni-
lateral incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome, there are
serious problems with implementing and sustaining the cooperative out-
come and therefore non-cooperative outcomes may be more relevant. It
seems reasonable to consider Nash equilibria, since neither the Weatern
nor the Eastern bloc is dominant in the arma race. This implies that
there should be no unilateral incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Typically, there are an infinite number of Nash equilibrium solutions in
differential games. Sometimes uniqueness can be obtained for special
information sets. For example, with open-loop information sets, i.e. the
informxtton 9e[ of each ~.ountry at any point of. time is assumed to be
~
{a0,a0f, the uníque open-loop Nash equilibrium solution (OLNES) can be
obtained [e.g. Starr and Ho (1969a)]. In general multiple Nash equili-
brium solutions exist. For example, with closed-loop (memory) informa-
tion sets, i.e. the information aet of each country at time t ia assumed
~to be {t,a(s), a ís), 0 t s C t}, an infinite number of closed-loop Nash
equilibrium solutions (CLNES) exist [Baqar and Olsder (1982)J. However,
if one restricts the class of CLNES to subgame-perfect equilibria
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(Selten (1975)], one can obtain uniqueness within the class of CLNES.
The reaulting outcome will be called the subgame-perfect Nash equili-
brium solution (SPNES). Starr and Ho (1969b) and Simaan and Cruz (1975)
refer to the SPNES as the feedback (stagewise) Nash equilibrium solu-
tion.
5.1. Nash equilibrium with open-loop information sets
The OLNES implies that each country conditions its optimal in-
veatment strategy on the initial stocke of weapons and therefore commita
itself to a path of levels of investment in weapons. The expected in-
vestment etrategy of the rival country only depends on initial weapon
stocks and not on past or current weapon stocks or on past or current
investment levels of the country under conaideration. It follows that
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle can be used, hence
UT f a{wP, t T(WTRtwLT) }~ al {BRa -(1-T)-1 } G 0
c.s., (26)
i ~ 0
U~ t a- a-( BR-g ) t 0
g




a~ (rfó) a- Ua -(rfd) a- a3la, lim e rt a(t) a(t) e 0, (28)
t~
a~ -(rfd) a~ - U~~ a(r-Há) a~-a3~a~, lim e rt a~(t) a~(t) - 0,
a t~ (29)
~
(10), (11) and (20), where a(a ) is the marginal value of the Western
(Eastern) weapon stock to the Western (Eastern) bloc, are necessary con-
dítions. The interpretation of (28) and (29) ís that the marginal utili-
ty of weapons of each country has to equal the rate of time preference
plus the depreciation charge minua the rate of capital gains in the mar-
ginal value of its weapons. Equation (26) says that no taxes will be
levied in the West when the marginal indirect disutility of the tax
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rate (-U7), arising from lower consumption, exceeds the marginal value
of the increase in i.nvestment in arms made poseihle hy a marRinal in-
crease in the [ax rate. Otherwiae, the marginal indirect disutility
equals the marginal shadowvalue of the tax rate which givea the tax rate
as an increasing function of the marginal value of Weatern weapon
stocks:
T s T(a) ~ 1- íBka)-1, T~ ~ 0. (30)
It follows that prívate sector consumption is a decreasing function of
the marginal value of weapons, c~ al~a, Upon substitution of (30) into
(11), one obtains
S a G(a) - T(a) W(T(a)) L(T(a)) ~ al(B!C-á 1). (31)
Equation (27) says that the Eastern bloc does not invest in arms when
the marginal disutility of arms expenditure, In terms of foregone con-
sumption, exceeds the marginal value of weapon stocka. In general,
~~ ~
-U ~ 3 a and consequently Eastern bloc investment in arms is an increa-
g
sing function of the marginal value of weapon stocks:
g~ ~ G~(a~) 3 BE -
a~-1~ G~~ ~ 0. (32)
a
It turns out that the OLNES can be easily characterized, since
the policy instrument, weapon stock and shadowprice of each country are
independent of the corresponding foreign variables. This is a direct
consequence of the assumption that the utílity function is separable in
~
a and a. The game is in a sense degenerate. The OLNES for the West fol-
lows from
A a G(a) - 6a a al(BfC-á 1) - 6a, a(0) ~ a0 (33)
nnd (5.3). The á e 0-locus Ss upward-sloping and the a- 0-locus ie
downward-sloping. The full phase-diagram is given in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1: Phase-diagram for the open-loop Nash equilibrium -
Increase in a3
0.
The equilibrium is a saddlepoint, which follows from det(J) --á(rfó) -
ala3(l~a)-2 ~ 0, where J is the Jacobian of (33) and (28) evaluated at
the equilibrium. The equilibrium is given by a(m) ~ a3~{(r~d) a(m)},
where
a(m) a ala3 skI{(alfa3)á f alr}. (34)
Hence, the steady-atate wenpon stock of the West is an increasing func-
tion of productivity (s) and the weights attached to security (a3) and
private sector consumption (al), but a decreasing function of the weight
attached to leisure (aZ), the rate of depreciation (d) and the rate of
impatience (r). ~
The OLNES for the East follows from
~ ,t ,~ ,~ ~r-1 ,~ ,~ ~á a G (a ) - da ~ (BR-a ) - da , a (0) a aG (35)
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~and (29). Thís yields a similar phase-diagram, where det(J )--d(r~6) -
~ ~ -2a3(a a) ~ 0. The steady-state weapon stock of the East is given by
a~(m) s a3 6~,1{(lfa3)d ~- r} ~ a(m). (36)
~ ~ ~ ~
Since a(~) a a3~(rfd) a( m), g(~) ~ da(~) and g(~) - da (~), it fol-
~ ~
lows that a(~) C a( m) and g(~) ~ g( ~) . A1 so,
(a fa )6 f a r
t~(m) S 1(lfa )d fir 1C ~ R(m) z al R
3
and
(rtd)a Bk (rfd)a2 81C~ 1 1
c(m) a(lfa3)6 t r~ c(~) a(al-~a3)d f al r'
(37)
(38)
An unanticipated increase in the weight attached to security
(a3) leads in both countries to an immediate increase in the marginal
value of weapon stocks from E to A(see Fig. 1), which causea an imme-
diate increase in investment in arms and associated reduction in con-
sumption. Afterwarda, the marginal value of weapons falls gradually
until the weapon stocks have reached their new higher equilibrium values
at E' (see Fig. 1).
Since the West has to levy distortionary taxes to finance the
provision of arms, employment and therefore output, consumption, ínvest-
ment in arme and the eventual weapon atock are clearly below the corres-
ponding levels attained in the East. However, the West may have a more
~ ~
productive technology (s ~ B rather than S a 8) in which case consump-
tion, leisure and arms in the West may exceed the levels attained in the
East. It is obvious that competitive arms accumulation leads to excea-
sive investment in weapons relative to the cooperative outcomes of Sec-
tton 4, since competitive arms accumulation does not lead to a morato-
rium.
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5.2. The subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
The CLNES implies that each country conditions its optimal in-
vestment strategy on the current and, possibly, past stocks of weapons.
This type of information structure admita, among others, threat strate-
gies which are briefly considered in Section 5.3. The solution set under
CLNES is typícally non-unique. However, if the principle of subgame-per-
fection is applied, uniqueness might reault. An equilibriian solution is
subgame-perfect, tf the relevant part of thie solution is also a Nash
equfLlbríum for each subgame. A subgame in this respect is a game over a
remainder of the planning period, say over [t,m) rather than over [0,~).
The subgame-perfect equilibrium must be a Nash equilibrium for any
~
t E[0,~) and for any {a(t),a (t)}. Considered this way Selten's (1975)
principle of subgame-perfection is very similar to Bellman's principle
of optimality, which is now assumed and not concluded. The solution
technique follows dynamic programming. This implles that each country
uses information on the current weapon stocks and does not commit itself
to a fixed investment strategy from the beginning. In fact the principle
of subgame-perfection rules out threat equilibria, which rely on infor-
mation patterns with memory, and rules out equilibria which cease to be
equilibria when something unexpected occurs. Under cloaed-loop informa-
tion patterns there might exist different sets of equil3brium strategies
which yield the same equilibrium path of arms accumulation. This is a
problem of non-uniqueness in representation of the optimal policies. The
only set of equilibrium strategies, whích remains an equilíbrium solu-
tion when mistakes or dísturbances cause a deviation from the expected
equilibrium path, is the subgame-perfect Naeh equilibrium solution
(SPNES).
Although Pontryagin's Maximum Princíple is primarily constructed
for problems with an open-loop information pattern, an extended version
can be used to find equilibrium solutions for closed-loop (no-memory)
information patterns. To the right-hand sides of equations (28) and (29)
~ ~
the extra terms (-gaa~) and (-i ~a~) have to be added reapectively,
~where l~ (a~) is the marginal válue of the Eastern (Western) weapon
~stock to the Western (Eastern) bloc and where a~ and a~ have to satisfy
the additional necessary conditions
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a,~ -(rfó) 1~, -~ a3~a~ -g~~ a~, lim e-rt ~~(t) a~(t) ' U~ (39)
a t~
a~ 3(rfá) a~ f a3~a - ta ,1~, lim e rt a~(t) a(t) a 0. (40)
t~
Note that the user cost of defence, i.e. the rental plus depreclation
charges minus capital gains ((rfó-a~a)a), now has to match the marginal
benefit of weapons (a3~a) plus an extra term to allow for the closed-~loop nature of the information patterns (g a~). Since one normally ex-a
pects the rival country to step up its investment in arms when the home
~country's weapon stock increases (ga ~ 0) and the marginal value of the
Eastern weapon stock to the West to be negative (a~ ~ 0), one expects
this extra term to reduce the marginal benefit of weapons. Hence, one
expecta less weapon stocks and therefore greater welfare when countries
can monitor their rival's weapon stock. Indeed, van der Ploeg and de
7.eeuw (19ii6a) prove this for a symmetric model with lump-sum taxation
and quadratic preEerences. iiowever, these insights only hold when
defence is not separable in home and foreign weapon stocks.
The SPNES ís expressed in terms of the value function V(t,a,a~`)
~ ~and V(t,a ,a) which are the equílibrium values for the indirect inter-
temporal utility functions when the game would start in time period t
with weapon stocks a and a~. Note that Va a a, V~- a~, Va a a~ and
V~~ ~ a~ establishes the relationahip between ~he SPNES and the class
o~ CLNES. The value functions V and V~ have to satisfy the Hamílton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations
Vt - rV f max {Va[ t W( r) L( T) - áa] f V ~[g~-da~] t
t a
U(T.a.a~)} ' U~ (41)




UT f Va{wR f T(WTRfWLT) } - al {BRVa - ( 1-T)-1 } G 0
c.s., (43)
T ~ 0
U~~ f V~~ - V~~ -(BR-g~)-1 G 0
g a a c.s. (44)
Even for the stationary situation with interior solutions the explicit
functtonal forms of the value functlona V and V~ are very difficult to
find. However, on the basis of two specific aspects of the preaent pro-
blem it can be concluded that the equilibri~ paths for the weapon
stocks and the equilibrium valuea for the investmenta in arma of the
SPNES and the OLNES coincide. These specific aspects are the separabili-
ty of the índírect utility functions in the weapon stocks a and a~ and
the absence of a direct influence of each investment and stock on the
accumulation of arms in the rival country. These aspects imply a decoup-
ling of the dynamic game, which restores the one-player property that
subgame-perfect control and open-loop control yield the same control
valu~s. The decoupling can alsri he recognized in the analysie of the
~~~ -r~ 1~~~1~1r r III.111"'i In ",.~ ~ I~~n ~, I. ~~1 52nr,F IH11 h Ilia drl~rlYdl~l I II c la Fa
laxed by considering the more general CES utility function instead of
the Cobb-Douglas utility function.
5.3. Threats as an inducement of cooperative behaviour
Suppoae each country aims at the results of cooperative beha-
viour but cannot rely on a cooperative agreement with the rival country,
because the rival country then has an incentive to deviate by accumula-
tinh m~~re weapons than the level agreed upon in the conpera[ive r,utcome.
ln ulher words, Uie cooperative outcome ia in general not eustainable
under competitive arms accumulation. llowever, if each country can employ
memory strategies, threats can be formulated in such a way that the co-
operative outcome can be sustained. Each country announces that, if the
rival country deviates from the cooperative equilíbrium, it will invest
so heavily in arms accumulation, that the rival country is deterred from
deviating. The struc[ure of such a threat equilibrium is given by:
is
i~ 0, if a~(t) z e dt aC
r big, if a~(t) ~ e 6t a0
~
g a 0, if a(t) a e t a~
~
g big, if a(t) ~ e t a0.
There are two possibilities. Either each country submíta to the threat
and the cooperative equilibrium results or a country does not submit to
the threat (because ít is not optimal to execute it) and then anything
can happen.
6. Consequences of non-separable preferences
In Section 5.2 it was argued that the separability of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function is one of the reasons why the OLNES and the
SPNES coincide. This Section therefore considers a more general nested
CES utility function:
-1a a -a a -a
U(c,R-k,d(a,a~)) ~{lfa (c 1(JC-R) 2] 4} lfa ~a~a~] 4} a43 3
al' a2 a3 ~ 0, a4 ~-1, al f a2 ~ 1 (45).
where a- 1~(lfa4) is the elasticity of substitution between private
gooda, a composite of consumptíon and leisure, and defence. The special
case of a unit elasticity of substitution (a4 a 0) yields the Cobb-
Douglas utility function employed sofar. This nested approach has the
advantage that the logarithm of the sub-utility function is still sepa-
rable, so that the choices for consumption and leisure are unaffected.
Upon substitution into (45), one obtains the indirect utility functions
a -a a -a -1
U(T,a,a~) -{lfa ~aQ(1-r) ll 4} lfa ~a~a~J 4} a4 (46)3 3
1q
and
-a a -a -1
U~(S~~a~,a) - 1{' fa Ia0(1-alg~)) 4} lfa ~a~~a] 4} a4 (47)3 3
where a0 - exp(a0). As before, the OLNES is found with the aid of
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle and the SPNES with the aid of dynamic
programming. Since an analytícal treatment becomea very cumbersome, a
numerical example will be diacuased in such a way that the length of the
working day in the West will be eight hours and the normalization
a19R a 1 is used.
Example
R- 24; al - 1~3; B z 1~8; d a 0.1; r~ 0.1.
The indirect instantaneous utility functions for this example are
and
-1
~ 1 1~3 2~3 -a4 a3 ~-a4 } aU( T,a,a ) ~ {1}a [ 1-T) 16 ) -F 1}a [a~a ] 4
3 3
-1-a a -a -
U~(g~.a~~a) z{lfa ~(1-g~I3)
16213~ 4 f lfa ~a~~a] 4}a43 3
6.1. Nash equílibrium with open-loop information sets
The flrst-order condittons describing the OLNES are (10)-(11),
(20), HT ~ 0, H~~ ~ 0, ra - a 3 Ha, rJ1~ - a~ 3 H~, ra~ -,1~ ~ H~~ and
g a a~ '~ ~ra~ - a~ 3 Ha where the Hamiltonians for the Western and Eastern bloc
are given by H- U f a(T-da) -~ a~(g -da ) and H - U f a(g -da ) f
~a~(T-da), respectively. Again, the equations describing the dynamic be-~
haviour of a~ and a~ are decoupled from the other equatione. The OLNES
for the example above is a saddlepoint and can be shown to satisfy the
following set of equations:
1 - 3 a4 - 3 a4-1 ~ a4 -a4-1
~rfd) 16 ( 1-da) Q a3 a a (48)
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and
2 a ~ -a -1
~ rfb) 16- 3 4(1-óa ~3) 4
a4 ~-a4-1
e a3 a a . (49)
The values of the weapon stocks and utilities in equilibrium for
a3 ~ 0.2 and for different values of the parameter a4 have been calcu-
lated and are:
a4 a a( p) a~ ( m) U
-0.5 2.00 0.514 2.526 4.651 5.660
0 1.00 2.308 2.127 4.219 4.431
0.5 0.67 4.303 5.183 3.353 3.764
1 0.50 6.337 8.042 2.532 3.219
The values for a4 ~ 0 correspond to the results (34) and (36) which were
obtained for Cobb-Douglas utility functions. An íncrease in a4 or, al-
ternatively, a decrease in the elasticity of substitution between, on
the one hand, consumption and leisure and, on the other hand, defence
leads to larger weapon stocks in equilibrium. The reason for this Ss
that less substitution possibilities between private goods and defence
makes each country more vulnerable to increases in foreign weapon
stocks, so that each country escalates its accumulation of arms. As be-
fore, for any given value of the elasticity of substitution, except for
o i m, the East is more efficient and therefore has more weapons and a
greater level of welfare.
6.2. The Huh~ame-pcrfect Nash equilihrium
The SPNES is considerably more difficult to calculate. In fact,
it has proven impossible to find the asymptotic solution to the coupled
system of partial differential equations describing the SPNES for the
example discussed in this Section. One possibility is to solve a linear-
quadratic approximation of the problem, since then a SPNES can be found.
It is not clear that this is a very satisfactory approach, hence some
progress has been made in the development of a computer algorithm for
solving discretized finite-horizon dynamic games.
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Each country is given a limited set of inveatment poasibilities
and for a finite number of stages a"tree" ia built in which the bran-
ches represent the investment choices with the corresponding utility
levels and the nodes represent the resulting weapon stocks. The algo-
rithm solves backwards recursively for each node the remaining aubgame
starting at the end of the tree. In this discretized setting these sub-
games take the form of bimatríx games. A description of the algorithm
can be found elsewhere [van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1986b)]. The horizon
is set a 7 stages and the security parameter a3 is given a value of at
least 0.2 in order to evoke ínveatments in arms. 5uitable investment
possibilities were experimentally established at 0.1 and 0.3 and the
~
initial values of the weapon stocks, a0 and a0, are aet at the equili-
brium values of the corresponding OLNES.
The purpose of this Section is to compare, for non-separable
preferences, the SPNES, in which the countries are able to observe each
other's weapon stocks, and the OLNES, in which the countries pre-commit
themselves to a sequence of investment choices and cannot monitor fo-
reign weapon stocks. Therefore, the OLNES is also calculated for the
same discretized finite-horízon dynamic game which implies solving one
large bimatrix game for the Nash equilibrium. Thus the OLNES solves one
128 x 128 bimatrix game and the SPNES solves 5461 (i.e., (4~-1)~3) 2 x 2
bimatrix games. Even for this simple example, the computational costs of
calculating the OLNES and the SPNES are considerable. When the horizon
or the number of ínvestment posaibilities goes up, the computational
cost goes up exponentially.
Three typical situations occur for the following three sets of
parameter values: {a3 ~ 0.2, a4 s 1.0}, {a3 a 0.2, a4 - 0.5} and
{a3 - 0.3, a4 a 0.5}, labeled I, II and III, respectively.
The results are:
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Case I Case II Case III
SPNES OLNES SPNES OLNES SPNES OLNES
~
i(1) g(1) 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0,3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1
0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0,1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
~7(7) g(7) o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l o.l
a(7) 4.396 4,396 2.832 2.935 3.618 3.724
a~(7) 4.794 5.032 3.250 3.356 4.279 4.279
U 14.326 14.033 15.015 14.906 10.469 10.520~~
U 17.423 17.527 16.770 16.599 12.720 12.577~ ~~
U f U 31.749 31.560 31.785 31.505 23.189 23.097
The most remarkable conclusion is that the SPNES leads to less arms ac-
cumulation in both the West and the F.ast than the OLNES and is therefore
better for the world as a whole. This is exactly what one expected from
Section 5.2, since closed-loop information effectively reduces the mar-
ginal benefit of weapons as each country now takes account of the fact
that, when it invests in an additional weapon, the rival will react and
escalate its arms accumulation. It is clear that a unilateral arms trea-
ty should give each country the opportunity to monitor the rival's
weapon stocks. The familiar result that the East has more weapons,
greater security and therefore higher welfare than the West is also il-
lustrated in this diacretized vereion of the dynamic game. The general
pattern in each case is that heavy investments in arms take place in the
early periods of the game and that more consumption takes place later
on. This is not unreaeonable in view of the fact that the marginal value
of weapons after the game is zero. In situation II both countriea invest
less in guns in the SPNES and thus consume more but[er than in the OLNES
and both countries achieve a higher level of welfare. In situation I the
East invests less in guns in the SPNES and thus consumes more butter.
However, because the West invests the same in weapons in the SPNES as in
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the OLNES, the East feels less secure and the trade-off between more
butter and less security results in a lower level of welfare for the
East. The West consumes the same amount of butter but feels more secure,
so that the West achieves a higher level of welfare in the SPNES than in
the OLNES. In situation III it is just the other way around. Sítuatíons
I and III are peculiar to asymmetric economies and discretized games.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper tries to improve the literature on the arms race in
two directions. Firstly, the arms race is modelled from an economic
point of view so that adequate attention is given to the "guna versus
butter" dilemma and to the way in which investment in arms is realized.
A decentralized market economy where distortionary taxes finance the
investment in arms is contrasted with a centrally planned economy. The
analysis is based on a utility function, which dependa on consumption,
leisure and defence. Secondly, the impact of information on the invest-
ment strategies is investigated where especially information on both the
own and the foreign weapon stock over time is considered. For Cobb-
Douglas utilities the separability ensures that there are no differences
in the outcomes under pre-commitment with static information patterns
and in the subgame-perfect outcomes with dynamic information patterns.
However, more general CES utilities lead to different equilibrium solu-
tions. It has been argued that the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
leads to lower stocks of weapona than the open-loop (or pre-commitment)
Nash equilibrium. This implies that the previous literature [e.g. Brito
(1976)] has tended to over-estimate the extent of the accumulation of
arms. As far as policy is concerned, thia suggest that countries should
be given the opportunity to monitor each other's weapon atocks as this
will lead to less arms accumulation and therefore to a safer world. It
has also been shown that a decrease in the elasticíty of aubstitution
between private goods, consumption and leisure, and defence leads to
larger weapon stocks.
There are at least four directions of future research. The first
ís to extend the framework to allow for international trade between the
West and the East. This would make the welfare of each country depend on
the government polícies of the rival country. For example, an increase
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in foreign government apending or taxea might lead to a reduction in
foreign consumption and the resulting balance of payments deficit might
be choked off by a depreciation of the real exchange rate and therefore
home welfare might fall. Such trade wars introduce flow externalities
over and above the stock externalities caused by conflict over arms ac-
cumulation, but they do not change the qualitative character of the re-
sults described in this paper. The second direction is to think more
carefully about the asymmetries between West and East. It seems more
reasonable to assume that the West is in a regime of Reynesian unemploy-
ment and the East is in a regime of repressed inflation [e.g. Malinvaud
(1977)]. Since the West has an excess supply of goods and of labour,
Western arms now have benefits not only in terms of higher security but
also in terms of Keynesian employment-generating effects. However, the
East has an excess demand for goods and for labour, so that expenditure
on arms in the East increases security but leada to longer queuea and
inflation. This seems to suggest that the West may have more of an in-
centive to invest in arms than the East. The third dírection is to con-
sider extensions that allow the private sector to accumulate asaeta and
the government to issue debt. This can intro-
duce problems of time inconsistency and credibility of each government
vis-à-vis its private sectors. For example, the government might an-
nounce to levy low capital taxes and high labour taxes ín order to en-
courage investment. However, once the machines have been accumulated,
the government has an incentive to renege and levy higher capital taxes
than promised. Another example is a surprise inflation tax. It may well
be that, when there is international trade and governments cannot cre-
dibly pre-commit themselves, international cooperation is counter-pro-
ductive as multilateral reneging doea not induce a depreciation and in-
flation costs [see Rogoff (1985)]. It would be exciting to investigate
whether such counter-intuitive results can be obtained in multi-country
models of arms conflict. It would also be interesting to analyse repu-
tational equilibria wíthin the context of such models. The final direc-
tion of future research extends the economic framework of competitive
arms accumulation from two to more than two countries. It may well be
that, when the analysis is reatricted to two countriea, important ad-
verse responaea from third countriea are overlooked. Cooperation may no
longer lead to multilateral disarmament, i.e. a moratorium on investment
25
in weapons, as this might provoke an arms build-up or even an attack of
third countries. The economic analogue of this result for international
monetary coordination between three countries is provided by Canzoneri
and Henderson (1986).
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